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Humans, even babies, perceive causality when one shape moves briefly and linearly after
another. Motion timing is crucial in this and causal impressions disappear with short
delays between motions. However, the role of temporal information is more complex:
it is both a cue to causality and a factor that constrains processing. It affects ability to
distinguish causality from non-causality, and social from mechanical causality. Here we
study both issues with 3- to 7-year-olds and adults who saw two computer-animated
squares and chose if a picture of mechanical, social or non-causality fit each event best.
Prior work fit with the standard view that early in development, the distinction between
the social and physical domains depends mainly on whether or not the agents make
contact, and that this reflects concern with domain-specific motion onset, in particular,
whether the motion is self-initiated or not. The present experiments challenge both
parts of this position. In Experiments 1 and 2, we showed that not just spatial, but
also animacy and temporal information affect how children distinguish between physical
and social causality. In Experiments 3 and 4 we showed that children do not seem to
use spatio-temporal information in perceptual causality to make inferences about self- or
other-initiated motion onset. Overall, spatial contact may be developmentally primary in
domain-specific perceptual causality in that it is processed easily and is dominant over
competing cues, but it is not the only cue used early on and it is not used to infer motion
onset. Instead, domain-specific causal impressions may be automatic reactions to specific
perceptual configurations, with a complex role for temporal information.
Keywords: perception of causality, social causality, physical causality, causal reasoning, domain-specificity,
agency, animacy, cognitive development
INTRODUCTION
Humans, including infants from 6 months, perceive causality
when one geometric shape moves briefly after another, on a linear
path. Motion timing is crucial in this and causal impressions dis-
appear with short delays between the motions. However, the role
of temporal information in perceptual causality is more complex
than this: it provides not only cues to causality but is also a pro-
cessing factor. It affects not only ability to distinguish causality
from non-causality, as commonly emphasized, but also to dis-
tinguish social from mechanical causality. Here we consider this
wider role of temporal information with children aged 3 to 7 years
and adults.
Perceptual causality in motion sequences obviously lacking
real causality has been the topic of much research since Michotte’s
(1963) seminal work, which continues to attract interest because
it promises one simple solution to the complex problem of how
we know about cause and effect. Michotte argued that in some
cases we do not need to know, but can simple see causality. Rather
than requiring much experience with relevant events, and com-
plex reasoning to link the experienced events to another, causality
appears as a Gestalt property of particular motion sequences. Just
as we see a triangle when shown three appropriately configured
corners (Kanizsa, 1976), we see causality, one event producing
another, when shown two motions in appropriately configured
sequence. This provides us with a perceptual identification of
what cause is that does not require any conceptual knowledge or
understanding.
Michotte’s prime example was the launch event, in which
shape A moved up to and contacted a stationary shape B and
stopped, while B began to move away immediately (Figure 1A).
For this sequence people typically report seeing A launch B, i.e.,
physical causality, confirmed by many independent studies (e.g.,
Schlottmann et al., 2006). A temporal delay of half a second or
less at the point of contact destroys this impression in adults, as
does a gap of a few millimeters. However, the overall impression
depends on the configuration, affected also by speed and other
factors, e.g., small gaps are tolerated at high speeds with small
delays (Schlottmann and Anderson, 1993).
Later on, Kanizsa and Vicario (1968) also found perceived
social causality in reaction events, very similar to launch events,
but without contact (Figure 1B): a moves up to B, but B begins
to move away before A could reach it. Both move simultaneously
for a fraction of a second, then A stops and B moves away. Now
people report social causality, that A is chasing B and B is run-
ning away, also confirmed independently (e.g., Schlottmann et al.,
2006). Michotte and others, in particular White (e.g., White and
Milne, 1997, 1999), have provided many other examples of what
White calls interaction impressions, e.g., impressions of pulling,
www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 365 | 1
Schlottmann et al. Perceptual causality in young children
FIGURE 1 | Michotte’s (1963) launch event (top—A) and Kanizsa and Vicario’s reaction event (bottom—B).
bursting, etc., typically for interactions in the physical domain,
while work in the Heider and Simmel (1944) tradition suggests
extensions to the social domain. In the present study, however, we
focus on launch and reaction causality.
Perceptual causality independent of reasoning and learning,
dependent only on particular structural features, as claimed since
Michotte (1963), remains controversial for adults. After all, adults
have relevant experience and a conceptual understanding of cause
that they could bring to bear on interpretation of these sim-
ple motion sequences, which for the most part can be seen as
representations of real causal events. Thus, White (2006) argues
that causal interaction impressions arise when an event triggers
a matching representation in memory, and the involvement of
memory in adults’ impression is difficult to rule out.
On the other hand, there have been multiple demonstrations
of perceptual causality in infants (Leslie and Keeble, 1987; Oakes,
1994; Cohen and Amsel, 1998; Schlottmann and Surian, 1999;
Schlottmann et al., 2009, 2012). Infants have little relevant expe-
rience and presumably lack an a priori understanding of cause
that would allow them to identify particular sequences as poten-
tial cause and effect sequences. These demonstrations make a
claim that causality is perceived more plausible, andmany infancy
researchers take this view (Leslie and Keeble, 1987; Schlottmann
et al., 2009, 2012, see Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000).
In modification of Michotte’s original claims, the view that
causality is perceived need not imply that infants’ and adults’
experience does not contribute. Instead of a modular reading
(Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000), the claim might be merely that
there is a perceptual core to causal structure on which learning
can build: if from infancy we see certain instances of causality
even without relevant knowledge, this would support the acqui-
sition of knowledge relevant to these causal events. Perception
links the events together, and children can then figure out at
their leisure why the events go together. These more rational and
experience-dependent analyses of perceived causal links may well
come to affect the perceptual impression subsequently. On this
non-modular reading one can hold that causality is perceived,
without denying that it is affected by experience and knowl-
edge, thus sidestepping the controversy (Schlottmann, 2000;
Schlottmann et al., 2009, 2012).
While perceptual causality has been much studied with adults
and with infants, there is less work with talking-age children. Yet
this is important—in infants perceptual causality can be inferred
only indirectly from how long they look at launch and reaction
events, but for direct evidence we need some form of perceptual
report requiring language and therefore older children. The prob-
lem is, however, that children find it difficult to freely express their
perception, and that the drawn-out, age-related changes found
in early studies of children’s verbal reports of launch and related
events (Olum, 1956, 1958; Lesser, 1974, 1977; Thommen et al.,
1998) could reflect development of perceptual causality or sim-
ply language development. That the latter is substantially involved
follows from a study reporting perceived launch and reaction
causality from age 3, when language requirements were reduced
by asking children whether a picture of Postman Pat engaging in
a physical or social or non-causal interaction fit various motion
events (Schlottmann et al., 2002); the present study also adopts
this picture methodology.
When we use a methodology other than free verbal reports,
it is conceivable that observers may not report their spontaneous
causal perception, but that the use of social and physical causal
language is metaphorical, and that observers merely draw analo-
gies between motion patterns on the screen and memories of
real world events triggered, in this case, by stationary pictures
or instructions. In the extreme, observers may not represent the
causality of motions on the screen at all, but merely use such lan-
guage after matching screen motion and event memory on lower
level features. Adults, in contrast to this view, do spontaneously
report causality in these types of screen events, and there is good
agreement between results found with free report and structured
responses, as typically used in contemporary studies (for review,
see Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000; Schlottmann et al., 2006).
This worry is unfounded with children as well: it is already
clear that even preverbal infants represent the causal, not just
spatio-temporal structure of launch and reaction events, as
reviewed above, and there is no reason to assume that this
representation is lost in talking-age children. Moreover, that
young children report analogies prompted by the instruction
rather than spontaneous perception is even less likely than for
adults: while pre-schoolers are capable of analogical inference,
they are not prone to do so unless there is clear agent simi-
larity between domains or knowledge of the underlying causal
relations (see Goswami, 1992; Rattermann and Gentner, 1998;
and discussion in Schlottmann et al., 2002). Note also that
even the strongest Michottian claim is not that observers con-
fuse these screen events with physical/social causation in the
real world, it is merely that observers see one shape launch-
ing/chasing the other, being aware at the same time that these
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are all just shapes on a screen. Use of a structured method-
ology with children therefore would not seem to fundamen-
tally change the nature of the task, but merely increases its
sensitivity.
When such a structured picture methodology was used instead
of free verbal report, pre-schoolers easily recognized basic forms
of perceptual causality, but there were also age-related changes
in the role of various perceptual cues (Schlottmann et al.,
2002). From 3 years, children reliably identified launch events as
instances of physical causality and reaction events as social causal-
ity, distinguishing these from non-causal events with a delay, but
only 5-year-olds were as accurate in identifying non-causal events
as they were in identifying causal events. Younger children often
over-attributed causality, in part due to a causal response bias.
This study thus suggests, firstly, that children’s facility with the
causal-noncausal distinction develops over the preschool range,
while, secondly, the domain distinction seems well-established
by age 3.
On the first point, it may seem surprising that children have
difficulty with delayed events, given that infants perceive causality
in causal but not delayed sequences. However, this makes sense
when we consider that causal perception of some events does not
imply non-causal perception of others. While launch and reaction
events may be perceptually “special” with a relatively automatic
meaning, this does not hold for delay events, which are perceptu-
ally neutral, without meaning. Children have to think about their
interpretation, which is more difficult at younger ages.
The second point, that even the youngest children had no diffi-
culty at all distinguishing domains of perceptual causality, agrees
well with the standard position that from infancy interactions
in the physical and social worlds are distinguished by whether
the agents make contact or not (Premack, 1990; Mandler, 1992,
2004; Baron-Cohen, 1994; Leslie, 1994, 1995; Baron-Cohen and
Ring, 1995; Carey, 2009): this is because mechanical interactions
require spatial contiguity while social agents can also interact
from afar. The absence of contact indicates that an action was self-
initiated, and only social agents are capable of this. Concern with
contact thus ultimately reflects concern with domain-specific
mechanisms of causation.
For adults, of course, spatial contiguity is not the only cue
to the causal domain. In perceptual causality, for instance,
adults attend to animacy cues as well, attributing social causal-
ity more when the shapes move in apparently animate manner
(Schlottmann et al., 2006), but this did not affect children, even
though they recognized the movement as animate (Schlottmann
et al., 2002). On face value, these data thus suggest late devel-
opmental change in how domains of perceptual causality are
distinguished, with children, like adults, attending to contact rela-
tions from very early on, while other cues are attended only much
later. The present studies evaluate this view.
Our first experiment reconsiders the previously found neglect
of animacy cues: is this a true developmental difference, or could
it be merely a secondary consequence of children’s difficulties
with temporal delays, discussed above? The inclusion of delay
events in perceptual causality tasks may tax children’s process-
ing resources, and as a result children may not be able to attend
to all cues available. On this view, if the task is simplified, by
elimination of difficult non-causal events, this may free resources
to attend to animacy. But this should continue to be neglected
if there is a developmental difference in how children and adults
distinguish domains of perceptual causality.
Should children be able to consider other than spatial infor-
mation in Experiment 1, this raises the question whether the
already established distinction of reaction from launch causal-
ity is best described as reflecting attention to contact rela-
tions (Premack, 1990; Mandler, 1992, 2004; Baron-Cohen,
1994; Leslie, 1994, 1995; Baron-Cohen and Ring, 1995; Carey,
2009), or whether temporal information plays a role as well.
The issue arises because launch and reaction events differ
spatially, but also temporally: one has contiguous, the other
simultaneous motion. Thus, both types of information could
underlie the earliest domain distinction in perceptual causality.
Difficulty grasping the causal implications of temporal delays,
described above, need not imply difficulty grasping the impli-
cations of temporal information more generally. Accordingly,
Experiment 2 studies children’s causal impression for displays
varying temporal and spatial information independently, to
assess whether temporal cues contribute to it as well. In this
study, therefore, we move from considering temporal infor-
mation as a processing factor that can impede or facilitate
processing, to considering the cues to causality that it might
provide.
Two further experiments consider at what level spatio-
temporal cues might affect children’s causal impression, in par-
ticular, whether children use these cues for inferences about the
mechanism of causation. If children mainly consider whether a
motion is self- or other initiated, as under the standard pro-
posal, then they may treat reaction events with occluded motion
onset as less social than standard reactions, inferring the pos-
sibility that contact might have occurred out of sight in the
former (Experiment 3). Similarly, if displays have both simul-
taneous motion-at-a-distance and contiguous contact motion
(Experiment 4), children may treat motion-at-a-distance pre-
ceding contact as more social than contact motion preceding
motion-at-a-distance, because the latter is not ultimately self-
initiated. If, on the other hand, children’s causal impressions
are relatively automatic reaction to particular perceptual con-
figurations, then they might treat the two motion orders or
occluded/non-occluded motion onsets similarly.
In sum, our experiments revolve around the domain-
distinction in perceptual causality. While the standard view
emphasizes the importance of spatial cues for a distinction
between physical and social events, we consider in two experi-
ments whether temporal and animacy cues may play a role as
well. The standard view also holds that children use the percep-
tual information to determine whether motion-onset was self- or
other initiated, and this is assessed in two further experiments.
We report the data as 4 experiments. However, one group of
children participated in Experiment 1, while another group saw
events relevant to Experiments 2 to 4, which are separated for
convenience of analysis and argument. A third group of chil-
dren provided additional data in Experiment 3 and 4, as noted
below. Thus, we have four conceptually, but not always materially
different studies.
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EXPERIMENT 1
The first experiment considers whether children can use other
than spatial information in determining domains of perceptual
causality. As discussed, previous work highlights children’s diffi-
culty with identifying non-causal delayed events. Here we con-
sider whether this difficulty might affect children more widely:
if it is processing-intensive to focus on whether events are non-
causal, this may reduce ability to process other task components
relying on the same resources. Elimination of the need to attend to
non-causality may thus allow children to consider cues previously
neglected.
We assess, in particular, if with reduced processing require-
ments, children’s causal impressions are affected by motion-style
cues to the causal domain. Michotte (1963) first reported that a
non-rigidly moving shape that rhythmically expands and con-
tracts gives a strong impression of animate motion (Figure 2),
and this appears for adults (Schlottmann et al., 2006), children
(Schlottmann et al., 2002), and infants (Schlottmann and Ray,
2010). This animate motion also strongly affects causal impres-
sions in adults (Schlottmann et al., 2006), but not children or
infants (Schlottmann et al., 2002, 2009, 2012). Here we test
whether this reflects processing limitations or a true developmen-
tal difference in perceptual causality.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Sixteen 3-, 4-, 5-, and 7-year-olds (mean ages 3 years 7 months,
4 years 4 months, 5 years 3 months, 7 years 6 months; ranges 3
years 2 months to 3 years 11 months, 3 years 10 months to 4 years
9 months, 4 years 11 months to 5 years 10 months, and 6 years 9
months to 7 years 9 months), from London nursery and primary
schools. Children consented orally and also had written consent
from one parent.
Materials
Children chose from two A4 sized drawings to illustrate the target
concepts. The same pictures were used as in Schlottmann et al.
(2002), with the physical causality picture showing Postman Pat
having kicked a football, while the social picture showed Pat chas-
ing another man. Neither picture involved contact between Pat
and ball/other agent.
Each child saw 4 different computer-animated motion events,
made with Macromedia Director and shown on a Macintosh lap-
top attached to a 12 inch color monitor. Each event involved
two squares (50× 50 pixels, about 2.5× 2.5 cm). Red (A) always
started on the left, moved toward Green (B) in the middle of
the screen and Green moved away toward the right. The motions
repeated continuously, with about 0.6 s (30 frames) black screen
separating cycles.
Two events were launch events, in which A moved toward B,
contacted it mid-screen, and stopped, while B began to move as
soon as A touched it. The other two were reaction events, in which
A and B remained about 3 cm (60 pixels) apart. A moved alone
for 30 frames, then A and B moved together for 30 frames, then
A stopped, and B continued for another 30 frames. In one event
of each type A and B moved rigidly at a rate of 4 pixels/frame
(about 9.5 cm/s) over 60 frames. In the other event, the shapes
moved non-rigidly, as in Figure 2. The square first extended over
10 frames at a rate of 8 pixels/frame with the left edge stationary,
then it contracted at the same rate with the right edge station-
ary. After repeating these steps twice more, the non-rigid shape
had covered the same 240 pixels distance in the same time as the
rigidly moving shape. Each event took just under 5 s.
Procedure
Children were tested individually at their school. Children were
first introduced to the response pictures and the target meanings
were explained by questioning about their content. If children did
not make appropriate statements, the experimenter (E) described
the pictures to them as in Schlottmann et al. (2002). This was
typically necessary for 3- and 4-year-olds.
Next children were shown the stationary squares on the screen.
Children were told they would see different movies in which
these squares would move, and to watch carefully so that they
could explain afterwards what was happening in the movie; chil-
dren were also told that the pictures would help them with this.
Then the first movie was shown. After watching for an uninter-
rupted cycle, E pointed to the physical picture asking “does the
green move because the red has hit, like in this picture?” She
then pointed to the social picture asking “Or does the green move
because it wants to run away from red, which is chasing it, like in
this picture?” The event kept cycling until the child made a choice.
Questions were typically not needed anymore after a couple of
movies, with children pointing spontaneously, but questions were
repeated as necessary. Sessions took about 10min, with most of
this time spent on initial discussion of the pictures. Movies were
presented in individually randomized order.
Results
Table 1 gives the percentage of physical or social attributions to
four events. The data replicate previous findings that all ages
see contact events (rows 1 and 2) as largely involving physical
causality, while non-contact events involve psychological causal-
ity (rows 3 and 4). However, in contrast to previous work,
FIGURE 2 | Michotte’s (1963) caterpillar stimulus. The square appears to move itself by first rhythmically expanding from the right edge, then contracting
from the left edge.
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Table 1 | Percentage of physically and socially causal attributions, in 4 age groups, for launch events with contact and reaction events without,
each involving rigid, inanimate, or non-rigid, animate motion in Experiment 1.
Row No. Event Age
Spatial feature Motion style 3 years 4 years 5 years 7 years
Phy Soc Phy Soc Phy Soc Phy Soc
1 Contact Rigid 88 12 94 6 100 0 100 0
2 Contact Non-rigid 56 44 31 69 50 50 31 69
3 No Contact Rigid 56 44 25 75 6 94 19 81
4 No Contact Non-rigid 19 81 6 91 25 75 0 100
Modal values in bold.
agent motion affected children’s attributions: when contact events
involved non-rigidly moving shapes they more often appeared as
social causality, while non-contact events appeared more often as
physical with rigid shapes (rows 2 and 3). The effect was strongest
for the youngest children, who were split in their attributions.
Statistical analysis agreed with the visual impression. To enable
factorial ANOVA, physical attributions received a score of 1, social
attributions of −1. High proportions of physical attributions
thus produce positive scores up to 1, while high proportions of
negative attributions produce negative scores up to −1. Mixed
responses move scores toward the chance level of 0. ANOVA
effects can thus reflect the choice patterns in Table 1 (Lunney,
1970; Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1984; see Schlottmann et al., 2002).
The ANOVA here found not only a main effect of spatial infor-
mation, F(1, 60) = 101.76, MSE = 0.15, p < 0.01, η2partial = 0.62,
with more physical attributions to contact event, but also of
motion style, F(1, 60) = 42.21, MSE = 0.17, p < 0.01, η2partial =
0.41, with more social attributions to non-rigid motion, and
an interaction, F(1, 60) = 22.26, MSE = 0.11, p < 0.01, η2partial =
0.27, with non-rigid motion reducing physical attributions to
contact events more than it increased social attributions to
non-contact events. This asymmetry appeared for all but the
3-year-olds, leading to an age × motion style × spatial contigu-
ity interaction, F(3, 60) = 3.74, MSE = 0.11, p < 0.02, η2partial =
0.15, and an age main effect, F(3, 60) = 2.84, MSE = 0.13, p <
0.05, η2partial = 0.12.
When the age groups were considered separately, all ages had
spatial main effects, F(1, 15) > 8.44, but, as described above, there
was no interaction for 3-year-olds, with F(1, 15) > 10.00 for the
other ages. Five-year-olds had no motion style main effect, with
F(1, 15) > 8.44 for the other ages, due to a minor inversion in the
data: at age 5, but not 3, 4, and 7, social impressions for non-
contact events were slightly more frequent with rigid (94%) than
non-rigid motion (75%). The reason is unclear, but the effect is
small, with 5-year-olds, as all other ages, typically treating both
non-contact events as social.
Discussion
This study for the first time found animacy effects on children’s
impressions of perceptual causality, with events involving non-
rigidly moving shapes moving in an animal-like pattern generally
producingmore social, less physical responses from age 3. Overall,
the pattern was similar to that found for adults, including that
non-rigid motion affects launch causality more strongly than
reaction causality (see Schlottmann et al., 2006). This asymmetry
appeared for all but the youngest children.
The finding has two implications: first, there is not, after all, a
developmental difference in domain-specific perceptual causality,
such that this is affected by animacy only in adults. Rather, previ-
ously reported lack of animacy effects in children (Schlottmann
et al., 2002) may reflect processing limitations. When the task
requires thought about what delayed events mean, children may
not have the resources to consider animacy cues at the same time,
but when there are no delays, they do use animacy information.
Second, our finding highlights the different processing
demands of spatial, temporal, and motion-style cues in percep-
tual causality tasks. An alternative view is that the animacy effects
found here reflect more general changes in the task: they could
be due to a reduction in response complexity, with two, not three
response options. Or they might appear whenever children have
to attend only to two cues rather than three. However, elimi-
nating the need to attend to spatial information by presenting
only contact or only non-contact events did not improve chil-
dren’s performance even though there were only two cues and
two response options (Schlottmann et al., 2002; Experiment 3).
This argues against these more general reasons for children’s
improvement here.
Instead, we propose that contact information is processed
automatically in non-delayed motion events, even by young chil-
dren, in contrast to delays and to motion-style cues, so there
is little gain when the need to attend to spatial cues was omit-
ted in Schlottmann et al. (2002; Experiment 3), but greater gain
when delays were omitted here. This view fits with ceiling-level
distinction of contact from non-contact causality from age 3,
when children of the same age find it more difficult to distin-
guish causal from non-causal, delayed events (Schlottmann et al.,
2002; Experiment 1 and 2), and when they attend to animacy only
under simplified conditions, as studied here. Note that when both
attention to delays and motion-style was possible (Schlottmann
et al., 2002; Experiment 1 and 2), children attended to delays, not
motion-style, even though one could argue that at a rational level
the latter should be more important, with the non-rigid shapes
appearing as self-propelled animate agents capable of social inter-
action, and there is no reason why such interactions should
not contain delays. Nevertheless, delays seem more intrinsically
important to perceptual causality than the nature of the agents.
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In sum, the most important finding was that there is no devel-
opmental difference in perceptual causality between adults and
children after all: all ages can consider animacy information in
roughly similar manner. The experiment also further supports a
view that some aspects of launch/reaction events are processed
automatically, while others require attention, which may help
explain why children are not always affected by all the same
informers as adults.
EXPERIMENT 2
If young children can attend to other than spatial cues in per-
ceptual causality, then this raises the question whether their
distinction of reaction from launch events really depends mainly
on spatial information, as theories of infants early ontological dis-
tinctions suggest, following Premack (1990), or whether temporal
information contributes as well, because launch and reaction
events differ in both.
To study this, we varied temporal and spatial information
independently. Each child saw 6 events, in which A and B moved
simultaneously, contiguously or after a delay, either with or
without contact. Contiguous contact events are standard launch
events (Figure 1A), simultaneous non-contact events are stan-
dard reaction events (Figure 1B). Simultaneous contact events
correspond to Michotte’s entraining events (Figure 3A). Yela
(1952) has previously described contiguous events with sizable
gaps between the shapes (Figure 3B) as launching without col-
lision, but Schlottmann et al. (2006) found that adults do not
see such events as clearly physical. Gap events have not yet been
studied with children.
As discussed, preschoolers have difficulty interpreting delay
events. They do not lack perceptual sensitivity to the delay:
infants as young as 2 months can detect delays of less than
half a second (Lewkowicz, 1996), and 6-months-olds treat
events with delays between 600ms and 1 s as non-causal in
habituation-of-looking-time studies (Leslie and Keeble, 1987;
Oakes, 1994; Schlottmann et al., 2009, 2012). Nevertheless, 3-
year-olds often ignore delays of that magnitude in causal attri-
butions. Here, we increased the delay, to over 2 s, in an attempt to
make it more salient to children.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Three child groups, 30 children each, participated, as well as 22
adults. The nursery group (18 girls) had children aged 3 and 4.
The year 1 group (15 girls) had children aged 5 and 6, and the
year 3 group (15 girls) had children aged 7 and 8. Children were
from a London nursery and two primary schools. The adults (15
females) were typically undergraduates in their early twenties.
Materials
Children chose from three A4 sized drawings to illustrate the tar-
get concepts (Figure 4), featuring Postman Pat pushing a post
cart, Postman Pat standing while another walks by for non-causal,
independent motion, and Postman Pat chasing someone who
runs away. The agents did not make contact in any of these pic-
tures. We switched the physical picture from the previously used
football picture, to fit the entraining event better.
Events involved the same animated shapes, speeds and dis-
tances as before, but this time each child saw 6 different motion
events, all involving rigid motion. In 3 events, A contacted B
mid-screen, in the other 3 events, A and B remained about.6 cm
(60 pixels) apart. In contiguous motion events, with and with-
out contact, A moved first, and B began to move as soon as A
contacted it. In simultaneous motion events, with and without
contact, A moved alone for 30 frames, then both moved together
for 30 frames, then A stopped, and B continued for 30 frames.
In delayed motion events, A contacted B, and B began to move
after 120 frames (about 2.5 s). The contiguous and simultaneous
FIGURE 3 | Michotte’s (1963) entraining event (A) and launching with a gap (B).
FIGURE 4 | Choice pictures for physical causality, non-causality, and social causality.
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motion events took 240 frames in total (just under 5 s), with sta-
tionary periods at beginning and end adjusted; the delayed events
took 260 frames.
Procedure
The procedure was as before. When the first movie was shown
children were not just asked about the physical and social pic-
ture, but also about the non-causal picture: “Or does the green
move on its own, not because of anything red has done, like in
this picture?” Sessions took about 15min, including the initial
discussion. Movies were presented in individually randomized
order.
Results
In Table 2, contact events without delay (rows 1 and 2) received
about 90% attributions of physical causality, with no apparent age
differences, and with no apparent difference between entraining
and launch events. Thus, simultaneous motion per se is not a cue
to social causality. Delayed contact events (row 3), in contrast,
received far less causal attributions at all ages, and were typically
seen as non-causal.
For no contact events, in contrast, it made a difference
whether motion was contiguous or simultaneous: standard reac-
tion events, with simultaneous motion (row 4), were treated
as socially causal at all ages, while gap events with contiguous
motion (row 5) received more non-causal, less social attributions.
Delayed events without contact (row 6) were treated as non-
causal, slightly more so than delayed contact events. Performance
of the child groups on delay events was generally better than in
previous work.
In line with the visual impressions, the ANOVA (as before,
with score 0 for non-causal responses) found main effects of
Spatial and Temporal Information, as well as an interaction, with
the smallest F(2, 216) = 8.53, MSE = 0.41, p < 0.01, η2partial =
0.07. Follow-up tests showed no significant differences between
attributions to simultaneous and contiguous contact events, F <
1, with high positive, physical scores for both. In contrast,
simultaneous motion without contact received more social attri-
butions, with more negative scores, than contiguous motion
without contact, gap events, F(1, 108) = 14.08, MSE = 0.56, p <
0.01, η2partial = 0.11, which in turn had higher negative scores
than delaymotion without contact, F(1, 108) = 6.85,MSE = 0.42,
p = 0.01, η2partial = 0.06. Delayed events with and without con-
tact did not differ, with scores closer to 0, F(1, 108) = 2.14,MSE =
0.31, p = 0.14. There were no age effects in any analysis, all F < 1.
Discussion
Experiment 2 shows clearly that temporal information is impor-
tant for the domain distinction in perceived causality, not just
spatial information. As in previous work, contact events were seen
as physically causal, regardless of whether they involved contigu-
ous launch or simultaneous entraining motion. Events without
contact did not appear physical, and here the temporal structure
mattered: while simultaneous motion without contact appeared
as social causality, contiguous motion without contact appeared
ambiguous, with more non-causal attributions. Physical reports
of launching-at-a-distance appeared at no more than baseline
level found for all stimuli, in contrast to Yela (1952). The same
pattern appeared at all ages, including adult controls. It also repli-
cates a recent study on adult free verbal report as well as ratings
(Schlottmann et al., 2006). The difference to Yela’s (1952) early
results may reflect differences in stimuli, as well as instructions
that allowed for both types of causality in the newer work.
The delay events here had 2+ rather than 1 s delay as in
previous work. The extra long delay may have helped children,
with even half of the 3-year-olds considering delayed events non-
causal, an improvement over prior work, but as in previous work,
children still had clearer impressions of causal than non-causal
events. Age effects within this study did not reach significance, but
non-causal attributions to delayed events still increased slightly
with age, and appeared more frequently for delayed non-contact
than contact events, also as in prior work.
Overall, Experiment 2 agreed with Experiment 1 that even
young pre-schoolers attend to more than just contact relations
when determining the domain of causality, in contrast to the stan-
dard view developed since Premack (1990). In particular, tem-
porally overlapping, simultaneous motion is crucial for making
non-contact events appear to show social causality.
EXPERIMENT 3
Under the standard view, contact or its absence is so important for
the domain distinction because this indicates whether the motion
is self-initiated, and only agents are capable of this (e.g., Premack,
1990). On this reading, reaction events are seen as involving social
Table 2 | Percentage of physically causal, non-causal, and socially causal attributions, in 4 age groups, for 6 events varying spatial and
temporal features factorially in Experiment 2.
Row No. Spatial feature Temporal feature Event name Age
3 years 5 years 7 years Adult
Phy Non Soc Phy Non Soc Phy Non Soc Phy Non Soc
1 Contact Simultaneous Entraining (Figure 3A) 87 3 10 90 3 7 93 0 7 91 0 9
2 Contact Contiguous Launch (Figure 1A) 90 7 3 80 7 13 97 3 0 91 0 9
3 Contact Delayed Non-causal 23 57 20 40 40 20 27 63 10 18 73 9
4 No contact Simultaneous Reaction (Figure 1B) 17 7 77 0 20 80 20 10 70 18 14 68
5 No contact Contiguous Gap (Figure 3B) 20 30 50 17 40 43 23 40 37 18 45 36
6 No contact Delayed Non-causal 17 70 13 20 60 20 3 90 7 14 77 9
Modal values in bold.
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causality, mainly because without contact, B is seen to self-initiate
motion. The Experiment 2 finding that contiguous motion with-
out contact does not appear as social causality is already at odds
with this view. The next two experiments assess more directly the
extent to which children’s reaction to perceptual causality displays
reflect concern with the onset of motion.
Experiment 3 assesses children’s reactions to motions-at-a-
distance with occluded onset. The logic here is that not all
motions-at-a-distance are self-initiated, sometimes onset by con-
tact may simply have occurred earlier, out of sight. Occlusion
of the onset of motion thus allows for the possibility of ear-
lier, unseen contact behind the occluder, and if the onset of
motion is children’s main concern, this manipulation should
reduce impressions of social causality. On the other hand,
if children ignore this distinction, treating all motions with-
out contact, including occluded onset motions, as social, this
would fit better with a view that children’s impression is an
automatic reaction to the perceptual configuration. A reduc-
tion in social impressions for occlusion events may, of course,
grow with age, as children become more and more capable
of integrating inference about the causes of motion with their
perception.
Children saw various motions-at-a distance with occluded
onsets. In one event, both objects emerged, one after the other,
already in motion from the left edge of the screen, and eventu-
ally disappeared behind the right edge. This event, compared to
the standard reaction in Figure 1B, has a much longer period of
simultaneous motion-at-a-distance, which in itself might make
the event appearmore social. Another event therefore had occlud-
ers to both sides of the screen, with B and A emerging in motion
from the left and disappearing behind the right occluder, as if
seen through a window in the screen (Figure 5). Occluders were
spaced so that the event had the same amount of simultaneous
motion-at-a-distance as the standard.
In two further occluder events, B moved faster than A, so
that their distance increased over the course of their simultane-
ous motion. Backwards extrapolation then suggests contact some
time before. B and A emerged once in such quick succession
that contact was suggested just previously, behind the edge of the
occluder. In the other event, contact was suggested behind the
middle of the occluder. Although only simultaneousmotion-at-a-
distance was shown, inference about motion onset would in both
cases not just allow for contact, butmake this the likely possibility,
which should reduce social impressions even further, if children
are mainly concerned with motion onset.
The main issue, in sum, is whether events with occluded
motion onset elicit weaker social impressions than standard reac-
tion events, as the standard view would predict (Premack, 1990).
Such reduction might be due to children making inferences about
the possibility of contact motion. If this appears, it will also be
important to show that this reduction is not simply due to the
addition of occluders or reversal in motion order per se. To assess
this, we had two control events. One had occluders placed in front
of a standard reaction, so that B could still be seen to self-initiate
motion. The other had no occluders and visible onsets, but B
moved first, so that A ran after B, rather than chasing it away,
as in the standard.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Materials
Events involved the same animated shapes as before, moving
at standard speed from left to right, but the amount of visible
motion differed. In edge-to-edge motion (row 1 of Table 3 in the
results), B emerged, already in motion from the left edge of the
screen, followed by A, both then moved across the whole screen,
disappearing at the other side. This stimulus did not showmotion
onset, but 158 frames of simultaneous motion at a distance when
the standard had only 30 frames. In the occluded reaction (row
2), therefore, black occluders were placed on the screen so that
only 30 frames of simultaneous motion at a distance were vis-
ible, exactly as in the standard unoccluded reaction event. The
event differed, however, in that B rather than moving from rest
in the middle of the screen, emerged from the left occluder, and
A disappeared behind the right occluder rather than stopping in
the middle; also B moves first, rather than A. To test the effect of
the occluders per se, we also had a control stimulus with a stan-
dard reaction: a emerged already in motion from behind the left
occluder moving toward B in the middle of screen, which started
from rest prior to A reaching it and disappeared behind the right
occluder (row 5 of Table 3). These three stimuli had equal speeds
for A and B, as in the standard.
In two further occluder events Bmoved at twice the speed of A,
so over the course of movement their distance increased. In both
events A and B moved simultaneously between occluders over 30
frames, but in one event A was only 8 pixels behind B when it first
emerged, suggesting contact 2 frames earlier, just behind the right
edge of the occluder (row 3). In the other event, A was 60 pix-
els behind B when it first emerged, suggesting contact 15 frames
earlier (row 4). Finally, we had another control event, without
occluders and with visible motion onset, but here B moved prior
to A, rather than the reverse, as in the occluder events, but unlike
the standard (row 6). Shapes had the same locations as in the
standard, thus when Bmoved first, this increased the effective dis-
tance between the shapes during the simultaneous motion part to
300 pixels; it was only 60 pixels in the standard reaction when A
moved first.
FIGURE 5 | Occluded reaction. B (the black square) emerges already in motion from the left, followed by A (the lighter square); both then disappear on the
right; the amount of visible motion at a distance is as in a standard reaction.
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Table 3 | Percentage of physically causal, non-causal, and socially causal attributions, in 4 age groups, for 4 events showing
motion-at-a-distance without visible motion onset, and for 3 other events in Experiment 3.
Row No. Occluded onset events Age
3 years 5 years 7 years Adult
Phy Non Soc Phy Non Soc Phy Non Soc Phy Non Soc
0 Standard reaction (A and B self-initiated, A
moves first, data from Experiment 2;
Figure 1B)
17 7 77 0 20 80 20 10 70 18 14 68
1 No visible onset motion, edge-to-edge
(large amount of simultaneous motion, B
moves first)
7 23 70 3 27 70 0 37 63 23 36 41
2 No visible onset motion, occluders (same
amount of simultaneous motion as
standard reaction, B moves first; Figure 5)
7 17 77 10 3 87 0 3 97 0 5 95
3 No visible onset motion, occluders (B
moves first, vB = 2vA, distance suggests
contact behind edge of occluder)
19 13 69 13 13 75 25 13 63 38 0 63
4 No visible onset motion, occluders (B
moves first, vB = 2vA, distance suggests
contact behind middle of occluder)
0 6 94 25 13 63 31 0 69 6 13 81
5 Control: standard reaction with occluders
(A moves first, no visible onset, B moves
2nd, self-initiated)
17 53 30 20 50 30 10 83 7 0 23 77
6 Control: unoccluded non-standard reaction
(A and B self-initiated, B moves first)
19 31 50 0 63 38 6 50 44 0 56 44
Modal values in bold.
Subjects and procedure
The same children as in Experiment 2 participated, seeing the
three stimuli with equal speeds (1, 2, and 5 in Table 4), and other
stimuli reported later in Experiment 4, in a 10min long second
session on the afternoon of the day of Experiment 2. Children
were briefly reminded of target concepts and questions, then the
study proceeded as before.
As with any within subjects experiment, there is a possibil-
ity of carry-over and learning effects. In fact, we expect that
children will indeed remember the general task set-up, in order
to make instruction for the second session simpler. We pre-
sented the stimuli in two sessions to reduce noise in the data
due to overly long sessions affecting children’s concentration.
The possibility of introducing artifacts, for instance, due to chil-
dren communicating about the study in between sessions is
slim, e.g., the verbal report studies (Olum, 1956, 1958; Lesser,
1974, 1977) show that children of this age cannot appropriately
describe such stimuli. As for stimulus-specific learning effects, we
randomized stimulus presentation within each session to con-
trol for this, but this does not, of course, preclude learning
from the first to the second session. However, the only learning
effects reported in the perceptual causality literature are stim-
ulus adaptation effects within a given session for adults (e.g.,
Gruber et al., 1957; Powesland, 1959; Schlottmann et al., 2006;
Woods et al., 2012), such that exposure to many causal stimuli
increases sensitivity to and exclusion of stimuli with deviations
from the causal category. It has, however, not been shown that
such effects last beyond the experimental session. In any event,
the first session stimuli here typically appeared half as causal,
half as non-causal, so sizable adaptation effects would not be
expected.
Another set of participants, 16 per age group, saw the other
three stimuli (3, 4, and 6 in Table 4), also as part of a larger
session, not reported here for the sake of brevity. The same pro-
cedure was used, but some stimuli were different. This set also
involved children from different London nurseries and primary
schools, and adults (mean ages 3 years 8 months, 5 years 9
months, 7 years 10 months, 40 years; range 3 years 3 months to 3
years 11 months, 5 years 1 months to 6 years 2 months, 7 years 0
months to 8 years 11 months, 19 years to 58 years).
Results
The first rows of Table 3 show that simultaneous motion at a dis-
tance elicits impressions of social causality even when motion
onset is not visible and both shapes emerge already in motion.
The impression is not at all reduced relative to the standard event
(repeated as row 0) by the absence of self-initiated motion onset.
Comparison of rows 1 and 2 shows that amount/duration of
simultaneous motion does not matter: motion from one edge
of the screen to the other (row 1) elicited the same propor-
tion of socially causal impressions than when there were only
30 frames of simultaneous motion (row 2). Attempts to suggest
the possibility of contact out of sight more strongly, by giving
the shapes initial distances and speeds that imply contact behind
the occluder (rows 3 and 4) produced at best small reductions
in socially causal impressions. The single exception to predom-
inantly social causality choices to occluded onset events is for
adults seeing edge-to-edge motion (row 1).
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These strongly social impressions are not due to incidental
changes in event structure increasing social impressions and com-
pensating for a reduction due to lack of self-initiated onset: the
data in rows 5 and 6 show that the presence of occluders per se
or a change in motion order if anything reduces rather than
increases social impressions. The single exception here is again
for adults whose social attributions are not reduced when the
standard reaction is occluded (row 5).
Two ANOVAs were conducted, one for the stimuli shown to
the first group of children (rows 1, 2, 5, as well as 0, the standard
reaction data from Experiment 1), one for the stimuli shown to
the second group of children (rows 3, 4, and 6), confirming the
visual inspection. In the first group of children, a significant effect
of event, F(3, 324) = 18.88,MSE = 0.36, p < 0.01, η2partial = 0.14,
reflected the reduced social impression on the occluder control
event 5, and an event × age interaction, F(9, 324) = 4.84, MSE =
0.36, p < 0.01, η2partial = 0.11, reflected that adults responded dif-
ferently from children on this and the edge-to-edge motion event
1. In line with this, there were no significant effects of age or
event, with uniformly high negative causal scores, when only the
children’s data were considered omitting event 5, F(2, 174) < 2.47,
MSE = 0.36, but adults differed from children on this event 5,
as well as on the edge-to-edge motion event 1, F(3, 108) > 3.09,
MSE = 0.34, p < 0.01, η2partial = 0.20.
When the three events shown to the second group of children
were compared (rows 3, 4, 6), no significant effects appeared,
F(2, 120) < 1.69, MSE = 0.556, despite the reduction in social
impressions apparent for the reversed-order control motion (row
6). This likely reflects lack of power with the smaller group size
(n = 16 vs. n = 30), because a similar size reduction for the
occluder control (row 5) was significant with the larger first
group. However, this slight ambiguity in result for the reversed-
order stimulus does not affect the overall interpretation. The
reduction in control events with visible onset would have been
important if events without visible onset had also shown a reduc-
tion relative to the standard reaction (row 0), but the events
without onset showed no such reduction.
If the equal and different speed occluder events shown to
the two groups of children are compared, then the small reduc-
tion in social attributions when contact behind the occluder is
implied (row 2 vs. row 3 and row 2 vs. row 4) is significant
in both cases, F(1, 168) > 6.97, MSE = 0.328, p < 0.01, η2partial =
0.04. The age × event interaction is significant as well in the
comparison of event 2 and 4, F(3, 168) > 3.99, MSE = 0.328, p <
0.01, η2partial = 0.06, with 3-year-olds showing no such reduction
in row 4.
Discussion
Events with simultaneous motion-at-a-distance but without vis-
ible onset are nevertheless seen as involving social causality, by
adults and children. In the equal speed occluder event, there was
no reduction in social impressions whatsoever, compared to pre-
vious experiments. When B moved faster and extrapolation from
speeds and distances implied contact out of sight, there was a
small reduction, mainly at the older ages, but even so responses
remained predominantly social. If observers see motion-at-a-
distance as social because it involves self-initiated motion, then
occludingmotion onset should reduce or eliminate social impres-
sions, because one can infer a possibility of contact. This is not the
case.
Substantially more motion-at-a-distance in the edge-to-edge
stimuli neither increased nor decreased strength of the social
impression for children, but for adults impressions were much
reduced. One possibility is that adults expect contingent motions
of animate agents not to be completely smooth and straight, but
to show small variations in direction or speed. Our simultaneous
motion, however, remained steady and constant over an extended
period of time, which might suggest a mechanically rigid connec-
tion between the shapes. From this perspective, the eventmight be
seen as a pulling event, as studied byWhite andMilne (1997). The
children here, however, seemed oblivious to this possibility. Note
that pulling is equally compatible with the equal speed occluder
event (row 2 of Table 3), yet no age seemed to entertain that
possibility.
While tangential to the main issue, it is also of interest why the
control events showed a reduction in social impressions. In par-
ticular, addition of the occluder to the standard reaction (row 5),
for children at least, eliminated social impressions even though
the simultaneousmotion was fully visible. The reason may be that
the stationary B was initially visible mid-screen, while A’s starting
position was hidden behind the occluder. Thus, childrenmay have
focused initially on B whichmay havemade themmiss some of A’s
motion when it emerged to the left. This would not affect children
in any other events, because all other events initially showed both
A and B, or neither. Adults do not seem to have had a difficulty
backtracking to A, even if only B was shown initially.
The negative effect of changing motion order (row 6) was
less clear, not reaching significance, but this may be mainly a
power issue. If we accept the reduction for the sake of discus-
sion, then it might be attributed to increased distance between
the shapes while moving. However, in an adult psychophysical
study (Congiu et al., 2010), distance effects wereminor.Moreover,
in events 3 and 4 here distances ranged between 8 and 180 pix-
els, with no detrimental effects. A more likely account is that the
changed motion order afforded a slight change in interpretation
that did not fit our instructions well: in the standard reaction
(Figure 1B), when A moves first, it chases B, and this in turn
causes B to run away. Our instruction emphasized this view, but
when B moves first from rest (row 6 of Table 3), B causes A to
run after it. Both views are of action and reaction, and B moving
first from behind the occluder fits equally with both, but event 6
does not quite fit the first interpretation. This mismatch may have
reduced the social responses at all ages, in other words, we think
this reduction, if reliable, is an artifact of the particular way social
causality was instantiated here. Again, this is a side issue.
The most important finding here was that the occlusion events
themselves showed little to no reduction in social causality com-
pared to the data from previous experiments. Observers do not
seem concerned with the onset of motion, but rather they react to
the motion configuration per se.
EXPERIMENT 4
As a second test of the view that children are mainly concerned
with the onset of motion, we considered how children react to
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potential conflicts of features typical of social and physical events,
i.e., involving both simultaneous motion-at-a-distance and con-
tiguous contact motion, in sequences of either reaction + launch
or launch + reaction events. In addition, this experiment also
allows an assessment of the relative strength of children’s reaction
and launch percepts.
To achieve reaction + launch and launch + reaction
sequences, B moved either faster or slower than A. The reaction
+ launch sequence began as a reaction event, with A moving
toward B, then A and Bmoved simultaneously. However, Bmoved
slower, so A eventually caught up, made contact and stopped,
while B moved on, as in a launch event (Figure 6A). Rationally,
with concern for the onset ofmotion, this sequence should appear
as social causality, because ultimately B’s motion is self-initiated.
To achieve a launch + reaction event, in contrast, B moved
faster than A (Figure 6B): initially A set B in motion, but after
contact both continue to move simultaneously, as in a reaction,
though at ever increasing distance. Rationally, this should appear
as physical causality, because B does not self-initiate motion. A
similar sequence might be observed in the real world in a collision
of a much heavier A with a much lighter B.
A second reaction + launch event differed from the one
already described in that B (rather than A) was the first to move,
but A caught up and contacted B nevertheless (Figure 6C). We
did this because we worried that if children do not show con-
cern for the onset of motion in standard reactions or in the
event of Figure 6A, this might be because they might initially be
drawn to the first (A) motion, missing the onset of the second (B)
motion which provides the crucial evidence for its self-initiated
motion. If B moves first, this should draw more attention to the
self-initiation of B’s movement. Again, the self-initiated motion
theory predicts more social responses for reaction + launch than
for launch + reaction sequences.
What, in contrast, is expected if children react to the percep-
tual configuration per se, without inference about onset? Event
order should not matter then, but, because all sequences con-
tain both the social and physical configurations, they might
appear ambiguous. Alternatively, one percept might be stronger
and could dominate. For adults, launch is stronger than reac-
tion causality (Schlottmann et al., 2006). For children, we do not
know this yet; we only know they identify launch and reaction
causality equally well. These conflict event sequences therefore
also address if launch and reaction causality have similar strength.
If so, conflict events might lead to ambiguous impressions. If, in
contrast, one interpretation dominates, then this percept may be
stronger.
Reaction + launch vs. launch + reaction sequences not only
differ in causal order, but also in the shapes’ speeds, so we needed
controls for how these speed differences affected the impres-
sion. Accordingly, we also had identical motion configurations to
Figures 6A–C, except that the shapes were further apart so never
made contact.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Materials
Events involved the same animated shapes as before moving from
left to right, and with A moving at the same speed reported pre-
viously, however, B moved either at half or double the speed, and
the initial distances between A and B were adjusted as needed.
In the reaction + launch event of Figure 6A, B moved at half
speed, so took 120 frames to cover the 240 pixels distance that
A covered in 60 frames. First, A moved for 30 frames toward B,
then both moved simultaneously for 30 frames with decreasing
distance due to the slower B. After 60 frames of motion, A had
caught up, made contact with B and stopped, while B continued
for the remaining 90 frames. In the launch + reaction event of
Figure 6B, B was twice as fast, so took only 30 frames to cover the
distance, when A took 60. First, A moved for 30 frames, then con-
tacted B, which began to move upon contact. Then both moved
simultaneously at increasing distance for due to the faster B, and
both stopped after 30 frames. In the second reaction + launch
event of Figure 6C, B again moved at half speed, but this time
B moved first in the reaction, not A. Initially, B moved alone for
15 frames, then both moved simultaneously with decreasing dis-
tance between them. After 60 frames of simultaneous motion, the
shapes made contact, A stopped and B continued for another 45
frames. Corresponding animations without contact had identical
temporal patterning, but the shapes were 60 pixels further apart
initially, so never made contact.
Subjects and procedure
The same children participated as in Experiment 2 and 3. The
first set of children saw launch + reaction and reaction + launch
sequences of Figures 6A and B and corresponding non-contact
control stimuli, interspersed in the same session as the occlusion
stimuli of Experiment 3, in individually randomized presentation.
FIGURE 6 | Conflict events involving both contact and
motion-at-a-distance. The top (A) shows motion at a distance followed by
contact when A catches up with a slower B. (B) middle shows contact
followed by motion at increasing distance due to B moving at double speed.
(C) bottom, again shows motion at a distance followed by contact with a
slower B, but here, in contrast to (A), the first shape to move is B. (Short and
double arrows indicate halved and double speed relative to the standard;
numbers indicate the duration in frames of each motion component).
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Table 4 | Percentage of physically causal, non-causal, and socially causal attributions, in 4 age groups, for 3 events combining contact motion
and motion-at-a-distance, and for 3 control events with the same temporal pattern, but without contact in Experiment 4.
Row No. Conflict event Age
3 years 5 years 7 years Adult
Phy Non Soc Phy Non Soc Phy Non Soc Phy Non Soc
1 Launch + reaction (A first, vB = 2 vA) (Figure 6B) 90 0 10 87 3 10 97 3 0 73 0 27
2 Reaction + launch (A first, vB = 0.5 vA) (Figure 6A) 90 3 7 87 10 3 77 3 20 45 36 18
3 Reaction + launch (B first, vB = 0.5 vA) (Figure 6C) 88 13 0 81 0 19 69 6 25 69 0 31
4 No contact control (A first, vB = 2 vA) for row 1 10 20 70 0 13 67 13 10 77 9 18 73
5 No contact control (A first, vB = 0.5 vA) for row 2 13 37 50 20 40 40 13 43 43 9 45 45
6 No contact control (B first, vB = 0.5 vA) for row 3 6 63 31 38 38 25 25 19 56 25 38 38
Modal values in bold.
The second set of children saw the second, non-standard reac-
tion + launch stimulus in which B moved first (Figure 6C) and
its control without contact, again as part of a larger session.
Results
Table 4 show that contact motion strongly dominates the impres-
sion: all conflict stimuli were seen as depicting physical causality,
even if B self-initiated motion-at-a-distance before A made con-
tact with it (row 2) and even if B was the very first shape to
move in the sequence (row 3). Data for the control stimuli
without contact (rows 4–6) show that the impression for these
conflict stimuli is clearly not a function of the speed parame-
ters used to create them, because these control stimuli elicit far
more social impressions, in particular when B moves faster than
A (row 4).
Adults, and possibly 7-year-olds, may give physical reports
to conflict events slightly less often than younger children. This
reduction wasmore pronounced when motion-at-a-distance pre-
ceded contact (row 1 vs. row 2), as expected under a rational
evaluation that therefore B self-initiated motion. However, in the
event of row 3, B was the very first shape to move, which should
have made the self-initiated nature of B’s motion even more
salient, but for adults at least this did not produce less physical
attributions (69%) than the launch + reaction sequence (73%).
The data pattern here is not entirely clear.
Statistical analysis of the events given to the first group of
children (1, 2, 4, and 5), found no difference between responses
given to conflict events, whether contact preceded or followed
motion at a distance (row 1 and 2), F(1, 108) = 2.23, MSE =
0.36, p = 0.14, η2partial = 0.02, in line with the main point that
responses to both stimuli were uniformly physical. The age pat-
tern was not clear in the statistical analysis either: the slightly
reduced level of physical attribution at the older ages produced
a small age main effect, F(1, 108) = 4.98, MSE = 0.44, p < 0.01,
η2partial = 0.12, but this did not differ between the two events,
F(3, 108) = 1.95, MSE = 0.36, p = 0.13, η2partial = 0.05, in con-
trast to the impression from Table 4. The patterns was not due
to the speed differences: for the control events without contact
(rows 4 and 5), there was no age difference; the only effect was
that social attributions appeared more frequently the event of
row 4, F(1, 108) = 17.00, MSE = 0.46, p < 0.01, η2partial = 0.14.
When conflict and control events were compared, these differ-
ential patterns produced corresponding effects of contact, speed,
an interaction, as well as an overall effect of age, the small-
est of these effects, with F(3, 108) = 2.98, MSE = 0.38, p = 0.04,
η2partial = 0.08.
When the reaction + launch stimulus shown to the second
group of children (row 3) was compared to its no contact con-
trol (row 6), the only effect was an effect of contact, F(1, 60) =
23.41, MSE = 0.71, p < 0.01, η2partial = 0.28, again reflecting
more physical attributions to the conflict event. When the two
events showing motion at a distance preceding contact motion,
but differing in whether A or B moved first (rows 2 and 3)
were compared between the two groups of children, no difference
appeared, F < 1.
Discussion
There are two main points to these results: first, children gave
the same response to stimuli containing both contact motion and
motion-at-a-distance, regardless of whether the event began as
a launch in which B’s motion appeared ultimately initiated by
contact (Figure 6B), or as a reaction in which B ultimately self-
initiated motion (Figures 6A,C). This result converges with the
finding from Experiment 3 that children do not seem concerned
with the onset of motion.
Second, the response children gave to these stimuli was
strongly physical, even though the stimuli were ambiguous,
involving a cue conflict. When the motion sequence includes an
element of contact motion, this apparently dominates the impres-
sion. This was not a primacy or recency effect, because it appeared
regardless of whether the launch element came first or last. This
was also not a function of the differing speeds used to create
the stimuli, because control stimuli with the same speed char-
acteristics, but without contact at all, elicited more social than
physical impressions, as expected. Adults may have somewhat
weaker responses to the conflict stimuli, but the age effect was
not entirely clear in the data pattern. Most importantly, however,
adults, like children, typically had a physical impression.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Four experiments considered how children distinguish domains
of perceptual causality in schematic motion events. The first two
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experiments showed that, contrary to prevailing opinion, even
for pre-schoolers identification of physical and social causality
does not only depend on spatial information. In Experiment
1, when temporal processing requirements were low, children’s
causal impressions were affected by whether or not the agents
move like animals. In Experiment 2, a brief period of simul-
taneous motion was shown to be crucial for impressions of
social causality in motion-at-a-distance events. Experiment 3
and 4 went on to show that simultaneous motion-at-a-distance
is not important for social causality because it signals self-
initiated motion: strong impressions of social causality arose
even in occluder events that did not show self-initiated motion,
but social impressions were eliminated in self-initiated motion
events, if contact motion followed. Our results thus suggest
that simultaneous motion-at-a-distance is an important cue
for social causality independent of concern with motion onset,
but also that contact motion is a stronger cue for physical
causality.
Below we discuss the implications of these findings. First we
evaluate the theory that children infer domain-specific motion
onset from the perceptual configuration, then move on to the
alternative view that domain-specific impressions are automatic
reactions to specific perceptual configurations, including the issue
of why contact causality appears stronger than social causal-
ity. Finally we consider the processing implications of temporal
information in perceptual causality, including whether contact
causality is processed faster than social causality, whether tempo-
ral delays between cause and effect affect perception in different
ways than learning/inference, and whether different perceptual
informers differ in processing demands.
ARE CHILDREN MAINLY CONCERNED WITH WHETHER MOTION IS
SELF-INITIATED OR NOT?
A classic view since Piaget (1969) holds that children attribute
intentionality to objects that self-initiate movement without con-
tact, which makes these object potential social agents. Premack
(1990) updated this in an influential paper arguing strongly for
parallel perceptions of causality and intentionality, such that from
infancy self-movers are automatically seen as possessing agency,
while (physical) causality is perceived when objects are propelled
after contact. Gelman (1990; Gelman and Spelke, 1981; Gelman
et al., 1995) further argued that humans of all ages are concerned
with the causes of motion, with animates having internal sources
of motion while inanimate motion is externally caused. In the
modal view, therefore, contact motion signals from infancy that
an event belongs to the physical domain, while motion without
contact belongs to the social domain (see Mandler, 1992, 2004;
Baron-Cohen, 1994; Leslie, 1994, 1995; Baron-Cohen and Ring,
1995; Carey, 2009). Typically this is discussed as rudimentary
thinking about the causes of motion, with early inferences sup-
ported by innate biases to attend to perceptual correlates of each
domain.
Importantly, under these views, contact or lack of contact
is not important per se, but because it indicates externally vs.
internally caused motion and thus potential for social agency.
The debate as to where perception ends and thinking begins in
infancy is perhaps unresolvable and certainly beyond this paper,
but the prediction from this view would have to be that early per-
ception/thinking should be consistent with rational expectations
aboutmotion onset, and that motion onset and other agency cues
should be more important than spatial or temporal parameters
per se in causal attributions.
In our study of domain-specific perceptual causality, how-
ever, neither children nor adults were concerned with whether
the motion was self-initiated. Primary concern with motion onset
would have predicted in Experiment 2 that contiguous motion-
at-a-distance in gap events should appear socially causal, not
just simultaneous motion-at- a-distance, and similarly we should
have seen social attributions for conflict sequences in which
motion-at-a-distance was self-initiated and preceded contact in
Experiment 4. In Experiment 3, in contrast, we should have seen
fewer social attributions when onset was occluded and contact out
of sight possible/likely.
Our results were quite different. Despite self-initiated motion,
gap events elicited at best ambiguous choices in Experiment
2, and reaction + launch events elicited physical choices in
Experiment 4. Thus, self-initiated motion is not sufficient for
perception of social causality. Self-initiated motion is not neces-
sary for this either, because in Experiment 3, social attributions
showed no sign of a reduction when motion onset was occluded.
This pattern does not fit the view that domain-specific impres-
sions depend on motion onset.
We should add that motion onset was not completely ignored:
although social choices were less frequent in gap than reac-
tion events, they were more frequent than in delay events, also
slightly more frequent in simultaneous non-contact than contact
motion in Experiment 2. When contact was strongly implied in
the occluder Experiment 3, this led at least to a small reduction
in social responses, and similar in Experiment 4 when self-
initiated motion preceded contact, this possibly led to a small
reduction in otherwise strongly physical responses, at least in
older observers. But while concern with motion onset may have
played a small role, it was clearly not observers main concern,
at any age.
Our youngest subjects were 3-years-old, while the motion-
onset theory was formulated with infants in mind (Premack,
1990; Mandler, 1992, 2004; Baron-Cohen, 1994; Leslie, 1994,
1995; Baron-Cohen and Ring, 1995; Carey, 2009), so it is pos-
sible that concern with self-initiated motion is predominant early
on, but gets overridden with age. However, the theory is meant
to align infant skills with later more rational expectations, and if
older children and adults do not have these rational expectations
for the present events, it undermines the theory, especially since
we saw no developmental trends.
There is surprisingly little direct support for spatial informa-
tion as perceptual basis for a domain distinction in infancy either.
Demonstrations that infants perceive causality in launch events
with and reaction events without contact are consistent with this
view, but it is not clear at this point that preverbal infants even dis-
tinguish two domains of perceptual causality (Schlottmann et al.,
2009, 2012). Infants’ expectations of contact differ for animate
agents and inert objects (Spelke et al., 1995), but this is the con-
verse of the claim that contact/non-contact signals whether the
action involves agents or inert objects. Only when self-motion
www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 365 | 13
Schlottmann et al. Perceptual causality in young children
is repeated and amplified, by second-long pauses and rever-
sals of direction it appears to serve as an agency cue (Luo and
Baillargeon, 2005; Luo, 2011).
Counter to the claim, on the other hand, are multiple findings
that simple, non-repeated self-initiated motion is not sufficient
or necessary for attributions of (social) causality or goal-directed
agency in infants. (Gergely et al., 1995; Csibra et al., 1999;
Schlottmann and Surian, 1999; Movellan and Watson, 2002;
Shimizu and Johnson, 2004; Johnson et al., 2007; Schlottmann
et al., 2009, 2012). This set of findings has not received much
attention, because the data are usually from control condi-
tions not of primary interest, but the studies converge on the
idea that the simple contrast of contact/inert object and self-
motion/animate agent typically assumed in standard theories of
infants’ initial ontology is too simple. Data from all ages thus seem
to argue against Premack’s (1990) claim that self-initiated motion
is automatically perceived as intentional motion.
This is not to deny that infants differentiate self-initiated from
externally caused motion, or that older observers can see such
motion as intentional. Luo et al. (2009) showed that 5-months-
olds had different expectations about the kind of activities a
box they had seen to engage in self-initiated motion or not
can undergo. They were not surprised if the self-moving box
reversed direction, stayed still when hit, remained in mid-air
when released, seemed to move behind an occluder. They were
surprised when the same box, presented as inert, only propelled
by a hand, engaged in the same actions. Infants were also sur-
prised when either object appeared to vanish from behind an
occluder or passed through an obstacle, so this not an expecta-
tion that self-propelled objects can do anything. Luo et al. (2009)
argue that infants have a concept of self-propelled object as pos-
sessing internal energy. This enables a wider range of actions than
seen in inert objects, but is not the same as that of an agent with
potential to engage in social interaction. In Leslie’s (1994, 1995)
terms, one is a mechanical agent, the other an intentional agent.
Self-initiated motion should be of primary concern as a cue to
social causality only if it is directly linked to intentional agency.
These views thus converge with the present position.
With older children as well, the results do not fit Premack’s
(1990) claim. It is easy for pre-schoolers to infer that animals
move themselves (Gelman et al., 1994; Massey and Gelman,
1988), but there are age differences in the inverse ability to use
self-movement as a cue to animacy/intentionality: Richards and
Siegler (1986) showed that from age 7 children saw spontaneous
motion as the most important cue to whether a novel object was
alive, but younger children considered limbed motion instead. In
Montgomery (1996), older 3-year-olds saw self-initiated motion
of a human as more intentional than pushed motion, but
younger 3 year-olds, even with extra help, did not do this to
the same extent. Thus, there is little evidence that self-initiated
motion is automatically interpreted as the motion of an animate
agent, but humans clearly develop an inclination to make such
inferences—when asked about animacy and when shapes differ
only in that one self-initiates motion while the other is pushed,
adults consider the former more animate (Gelman et al., 1995).
However, animacy/intentionality does not come up in sponta-
neous descriptions of such stimuli, nor is self-motion always used
to infer animacy when stronger cues are available (Schlottmann
et al., 2006).
In line with this, we argue here that seeing self-initiated motion
as intentional and thus potentially belonging to the social world is
a possible interpretation, not a necessary perception, and also that
observers do not consider this interpretation in domain-specific
causal impressions of Michotte-type motion events.
THE SOCIAL CAUSALITY CONFIGURATION: IS MINIMALLY
CONTINGENT MOTION-AT-A-DISTANCE OPTIMAL?
If an inference of self-initiated or mechanically initiated motion
onset is not crucial for perception of social or physical causality in
children, then one alternative is that children’s causal impressions
are automatic reactions to particular perceptual configurations.
In case of social causality, the effective spatio-temporal cue con-
figuration may be the shapes’ simultaneous, overlapping motion-
at-a-distance. This cue is not just temporal, because simultaneous
motion with contact appears entirely physical, as in the entrain-
ing events of Experiment 2, rather it is spatio-temporal, involving
separated, but correlated motion paths, discussed also byMandler
(2004).
Does the reaction event provide the optimal instantiation
of such correlated motion path configurations? Kanizsa and
Vicario’s (1968) reaction event was designed for a minimal con-
trast to launch events, allowing for demonstrations that minimal
differences between events can lead to a switch in the perceived
causal domain, so we know now that impressions of social causal-
ity do not appear only in events exceeding a certain level of
complexity. However, in the conflict Experiment 4, the impres-
sion was not determined by the minimally correlated motion
paths configuration but by the contact configuration. Moreover,
in adults at least, social reaction impressions are weaker than
those of physical launching (Schlottmann et al., 2006). This could
be because the minimally contingent motion-at-a-distance used
here is a passable, but suboptimal configuration.
One could speculate that stronger impressions of a social
relation might be achieved with more extensive contingencies-at-
a-distance, as in Heider and Simmel (1944), or Gao et al. (2009).
Judging from adults’ reaction to the edge-to-edge stimulus of
Experiment 3, such extended contingencies should not be rigid
and monotonous, but involve variations in paths, so as to not be
mistaken for mechanical linkages, perhaps pulling with a rope or
towbar between shapes (White and Milne, 1997).
However, the findings from children’s perception of the edge-
to-edge stimuli in Experiment 3 argue against this view: in
contrast to adults, children did not have reduced impressions of
social causality for these. This was the only sizable developmental
difference in the present studies, which rather intriguingly sug-
gests that impressions of a mechanical connection-at-a-distance
might develop later, with experience. On the other hand, chil-
dren did not have stronger social impressions either with the
edge-to-edge stimuli than with more minimal path correlations.
The present studies thus provide no clear evidence that exten-
sive correlated motion provides a better cue for social causality
than minimal motion-at-a-distance—and alternative views of
asymmetries in performance as in Experiment 4 are discussed
below.
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THE PHYSICAL CAUSALITY CONFIGURATION: FASTER TO PROCESS OR
STRONGER THAN SOCIAL CAUSALITY?
Our studies also provided data on physical causality, confirm-
ing that the configuration for this includes both contiguous
and simultaneous contact motion, launching and entraining
(Michotte, 1963), so physical and social perceptual causality are
not entirely parallel in this respect as well.
The main new finding here came from Experiment 4: phys-
ical contact causality dominated social causality-at-a-distance:
observers reported physical causality regardless of whether the
social configuration was also present, regardless of motion order,
and regardless of concern with self-initiated motion. Contact
causality thus seems to automatically draw attention and dictate
the interpretation, while other aspects of the event are ignored.
Strikingly, contact causality interfered with processing of pre-
ceding contingent motion-at-a-distance that would otherwise
lead to a social interpretation. One might speculate that this
ability of contact causality to override the usual reaction to a
precedent contingent motion-at-a-distance depends on how tem-
porally close the two perceptual configurations are. In the present
study, contact occurred after 0.6–1.3 s of simultaneous motion. If
this is insufficient time to complete processing, interference from
the contact configuration might preclude that a social impres-
sion is ever achieved. Presenting more extensively correlated
motion over a longer period may then well help boost the social
interpretation of conflict stimuli, not necessarily because more
extensively correlated motion is a better cue to social causality,
but because it would provide extra time to complete processing.
This account is not to deny the intrinsic advantage of the contact
configuration: while launch causality interfered with preceding
reaction causality, the reverse clearly did not appear, so either
processing of launch causality is completed far more quickly,
becoming resistant to interference earlier, or it is intrinsically
stronger, as would appear from the adult data (Schlottmann et al.,
2006).
A different reason previously considered for why social impres-
sions tend to be weaker than physical impressions in adults was
that even with similar strength perceptions, the schematic motion
events are further from social reality involving real animate agents
than from physical reality involving inert objects (Schlottmann
et al., 2006). That imbalance in impression strength previously
appeared only in adults, but not in children’s choices, or infants’
looking time data fit with the view that children are closer to
merely perceiving the events, while adults interpret them. Our
finding that all ages tend to see conflict events as physical does
not fit this view, but the processing time account outlined above
might help resolve the discrepancy. Further work on why asym-
metries between physical and social causality occur is clearly
necessary.
TEMPORAL DELAYS IN CAUSAL PERCEPTION AND CAUSAL INFERENCE
Temporal delay has received extensive attention, not just as a
cue to (non)causality but also as a processing factor. In percep-
tual causality it is typically seen as a cue. Delays from 100ms
or so reduce the causal impression and by 200ms or so it is
replaced by the perception of two independent movements (e.g.,
Michotte, 1963; Kanizsa and Vicario, 1968; Schlottmann and
Anderson, 1993). However, it is also clear that naïve observers see-
ing launch/reaction events for the first time tolerate far greater
delays of a second or more (e.g., Michotte, 1963; Schlottmann
et al., 2006). Formal studies of such adaptation effects (Gruber
et al., 1957; Powesland, 1959; Woods et al., 2012) found that
with more exposure to causal events, observers become sensi-
tive to smaller delays. Short-term experience thus demonstrably
affects causal perception. Such stimulus adaptation effects are
common throughout perception, and can originate at the neural
level (Helson, 1964; Clifford et al., 2007), posing little difficulty
for a view that causality is perceived in a bottom–up way.
Children are generally more tolerant of delays than adults,
frequently treating delayed launch and reaction events as causal
when they rarely treat events without delay as non-causal. As
argued earlier, this could reflect that delay events, in contrast
to causal events, have no intrinsic meaning, so children need
to make considered judgments, which improve slowly with age
(Schlottmann et al., 2002). In infant looking time studies, no
explicit judgments are required, and 6-month-olds have no diffi-
culty separating causal from non-causal events based on the delay
(Leslie and Keeble, 1987; Oakes, 1994; Schlottmann et al., 2009,
2012), but the shortest delay used with infants are about 600ms.
We can thus not entirely rule out that children have higher delay
thresholds in causal perception, or that delays are less effective
at degrading perceptual causality, perhaps as more long-term
adaptation.
In the present study, in any event, children’s non-causal
responses improved relative to prior work, for events with extra-
long 2+ s delays (Experiment 2). Performance was not quite at
adult level, but the small age differences were not significant any-
more. An alternative to this reflecting improved discriminability
is that only at such longer delays it becomes noticeably more dif-
ficult to learn a causal relation, with the default response shifting
from causal to non-causal.
To evaluate this possibility, consider that temporal contiguity
effects appear not just in perceptual causality, but causal infer-
ence more widely, under conditions not conducive to causal
perception, and that different processes could underlie contigu-
ity effects in these other paradigms. For example, at a rational
level, contiguity/delay effects can reflect concern with the time
course of assumed causal mechanisms, for adults (Buehner and
May, 2002, 2003, 2004) and children (Schlottmann, 1999). If
a known mechanism requires a delayed effect, e.g., an energy-
saving light bulb requires time to warm up (Buehner and
May, 2004), or a ball has to reach a bell via a slow runway
(Schlottmann, 1999), subjects choose delayed over contiguous
causes. Thus, top–down effects mediated by pre-existing causal
knowledge can reverse the usual cue relation between contiguity
and causality.
Contiguity effects also appear in causal judgments of the link
between subjects’ own actions and their outcomes, when subjects
may not be reasoning about mechanism, paralleling contiguity
effects in instrumental learning in humans and animals (Shanks
et al., 1989). In instrumental causal inferences, contiguous con-
tingent sequences are judged more causal than non-contiguous
contingent sequences, e.g., in Shanks et al. (1989, Experiment
3), 2 s delays reduced causal ratings slightly, 4 s delays reduced
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them more and as much as 8 s delays, but even then judgments
remained well above those in a non-contingent control con-
dition, so adults can learn causal links over extended delays.
Occasionally, contiguity effects even appear in the absence of
contingency (Anderson and Sheu, 1995, Experiment 4, delays
between 250 and 8000ms). We are not aware of any paramet-
ric studies of instrumental causal learning and contiguity effects
in children, but for adults it would seem that contiguity effects
in instrumental causality operate over a more extended time
frame than in perceptual causality. This could simply reflect
differential sensitivity of the tasks in disparate areas, but a
domain difference appears even with identical tasks (Huber et al.,
2004).
The implication is that while brief delays may disrupt per-
ceptual causality and access to an automatic causal meaning for
launch/reaction configurations, they may not yet disrupt a ten-
dency to infer a causal link between events. This may only be
reduced with much longer delays, and only then may young chil-
dren begin to give reliably non-causal responses. In the gray zone
of briefly delayed events, performance then depends on age, per-
haps inhibition skills, knowledge, external scaffolding and other
factors that might shift the response away from the causal default.
This speculative account, separating the role of temporal informa-
tion in causal perception from its role in causal inference, awaits
further test, of course, and yet another possibility is discussed
below.
DO DELAY AND MOTION-STYLE INFORMATION DRAW ON COMMON
PROCESSING RESOURCES?
The above discussion implied that in causal inference as envis-
aged by instrumental theories, temporal information is not so
much seen as providing cues toward causality, i.e., as infor-
mation that points to/away from a causal relation, but as a
processing factor. Rather than temporal information being rep-
resented explicitly, it constrains the computation, affecting the
speed of learning/processing or the rates/probabilities of out-
comes used to derive causal strength (see Buehner, 2005, for
review). Another aspect of timing as a processing factor may be
how it affects resource distribution. Causal inference (as opposed
to causal perception) is typically seen as a domain-general pro-
cess drawing on central resources, so if the inference is easier,
more resources are left for other aspects of the task. If delay pro-
cessing requires more resources than contiguity processing for
children, this might then affect ability to consider further cues
to causality. Such a resource account was considered here for
Experiment 1.
In previous work, adults had shown strong effects of motion-
style, with animate motion reducing physical impressions of
launching, but enhancing social impressions of reactions, while
children and pre-verbal infants seeing identical stimuli showed
no effects (Schlottmann et al., 2002, 2009, 2012), despite all
ages recognizing the motions as animate and inanimate. In
Experiment 1 here, in contrast, children from age 3 showed
clear reduction/enhancement effects as seen for adults previously,
which we attribute to more available processing resources when
the need to attend to non-causality was abolished. This result
was crucial in showing that previously reported age differences
in perceptual causality do not reflect a difference in perception,
but merely task difficulty.
The need to share central resources may also help explain
the improvement on delay events in Experiment 2 relative
to prior work. Not only were delays longer than in previous
work, as discussed above, but also the task did not involve
non-rigid motion stimuli. Without need to attend to animacy
information, children may have had more resources to cope
with delays. Thus, Experiments 1 and 2 had complementary
results.
To slightly modify the arguments from Experiment 1 in view of
subsequent findings, the data all fit with the view of a processing
hierarchy, such that non-delayed contact motion and simultane-
ous motion-at-a-distance are processed automatically and from
early on, while events with alternative spatio-temporal config-
urations, e.g., involving temporal delays, or motion-at-distance
without simultaneous motion, or events containing additional
cues, e.g., about animate motion-style, require extra processing
resources. Whether a task shows developmental differences then
depends on the extent to which it draws on these more processing
intensive elements. Michotte (1963) argued, for instance, that the
shapes’ speeds are also crucial for perceptual causality, but this
has not been studied with children. It is controversial whether
speed effects are perceptual or reflect rational physical inference
(Sanborn et al., 2013), so developmental data showing whether
speed is processed automatically and early, or whether, akin to
animacy and delay, this requires resources and shows age effects,
will be of much interest.
CONCLUSIONS
These experiments clarify development of perceptual causality.
Prior work showed that temporal information is important for
distinguishing perceptually causal from non-causal events. Here
we showed that temporal information also contributes to dis-
tinguishing domains of perceptual causality. First, contrary to
prevailing belief, absence of contact is not the crucial cue for
social reaction causality. The important cue is spatio-temporal
in nature, correlated motion-at-a-distance. Equally contrary to
prevailing belief, use of such perceptual information does not
reflect concern with motion onset. Second, the temporal struc-
ture of the event is also important because it may affect ease
of processing, as suggested by a trade-offs between attention
to delay and motion style information, or by the dominance
of physical causality in conflict sequences. We know little of
the processes underlying perceptual causality, but consideration
of the dual role of perceptual informers, as cues to causal-
ity and processing factors, might help move the debate beyond
the long-ranging controversy on whether perceptual causality
is modular or not (Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000; Schlottmann,
2000).
It is difficult to pin down in our study where causal per-
ception ends and causal thinking begins. In our view, rel-
atively pure causal perception might exist in young infants,
but by the age children talk they have had much rel-
evant causal experience affecting perception. Nevertheless,
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the absence of major age differences between 3-year-olds and
adults, here and in previous work, shows that this experience
does not slowly and gradually create a meaning for what before
learning were meaningless artificial motions. Rather, in line with
Michotte’s views, launch and reaction events, even to young
children and infants, have intrinsic causal meaning accessible
fromminimal information that experience merely modulates, not
generates.
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